Normative assessment aims to identify and acknowledge theoretical assumptions taking the form of value judgments that provide a rationale for empirical research or that provide a contextual foundation for empirical analysis. These value judgments are ever-present in empirical research.
As Diana Mutz (2008: 523) notes, 'empirical research findings are interesting and/or important precisely because they tell us something about some consequence that is positively or negatively valued.' That is, claims about the importance or relevance of empirical findings to matters of public concern necessarily rest on normative value judgments. The problem is that these value judgments usually remain hidden in empirical research, and may even go unrecognized by the scholars who implicitly make them.
Normative assessment can be useful for empirical research by clarifying which value judgments are supporting claims about the importance or theoretical relevance of empirical findings. The point is not to contend that one state of the world is somehow 'better' than another in an absolute sense, but rather to evaluate when and why a pattern of findings might be more important for some social problems than others, or might align more readily with some theoretical concerns than others. Normative assessment makes no claim about how the empirical world ought to be. It focuses instead on clarifying how empirical findings may hold implications for different schools of thought that themselves make claims about how the world ought to be.
Making normative assessments more explicit in empirical research is important because empirical research is never entirely value-neutral. The relevance of empirical findings can be determined only when the researcher clarifies why those findings are important, and judgments of importance are almost always predicated on some type of normative claim. Bringing these usually hidden claims to light is a particularly useful reason for making normative assessment a more routine component of empirical research: it clarifies the standards being used to make judgments about why a finding is important and what its broader theoretical implications might be.
The importance of normative assessment for political communication research has long been understood within the field. Among the leading figures in early political communication research, Paul Lazarsfeld (1957) famously advocated for the relevance of political philosophy to empirical research on mass politics. His argument advanced three main benefits of joining normative to empirical analysis: that the analytical precision of modern empirical research could lead to new appreciation of how philosophical arguments might be relevant to mass politics, that new hypotheses and conceptual refinements valuable for empirical analysis could emerge from a fresh look at 'classic' normative arguments, and that the joining of normative and empirical analysis could advance theoretical insights within political philosophy.
These benefits remain as important today as they were in Lazarsfeld's era, and political communication scholarship stands to realize some particular gains from making normative assessments of empirical findings. Explicit attention to the criteria for drawing normative judgments could clarify a broader range of communication phenomena relevant for empirical study, beyond the typical focus on the content of mainstream news and the attentiveness of audiences to that mainstream news flow. Clarifying the normative dimensions of empirical findings would also define a wider horizon of normative starting points for making sense of research findings. For example, while much attention has been given to the 'problem' of increasing market segmentation that leads to declining audiences for traditional news products (e.g., Katz 1996; Prior 2007) , the same tendency can be seen as a 'solution' for democratic communication from a different normative vantage point (this point will be taken up at length later in this chapter). In addition, explicitly identifying the normative first principles undergirding an evaluative judgment helps to anchor empirical findings more clearly in larger conversations about the nature of democratic communication that are taking place beyond the ranks of political communication scholars (see Althaus 2006) . Clarifying the relevance of empirical research to the concerns of political philosophy can help orient nonspecialists to the reasons why our empirical findings might be important to a broader range of scholars. Most important, normative assessment can help empirical political communication researchers avoid unrealistic expectations for media and citizen performance that arise from lack of reflective engagement with normative theories of democratic politics.
Normative assessment is therefore more like appraisal than argument. It clarifies the relevance of empirical findings for core debates in political philosophy rather than engaging directly in any kind of philosophical debate. Normative assessment detours around arguments about how to improve the quality of political communication. It sidesteps claims that one model of democracy or of the news is somehow better than another. Normative assessment aims merely to identify the core assumptions underlying statements of value that scholars use to assess the relevance or importance of their empirical findings. Such statements of value become judgments rather than assertions only when they are properly located and understood within larger theoretical frameworks. Normative assessment aims to do this by clarifying the implications that empirical findings have for normative theories about the ends and means of democratic politics.
Hidden Value Judgments in Empirical Research
Although normative assessments are routinely conducted in empirical political communication scholarship, they are rarely noticed because they are usually hidden in arguments that take the form of enthymemes rather than syllogisms. Aristotle's Rhetoric observes that most arguments made in everyday language borrow from the logical structure of formal syllogisms-if Premise X, and also Premise Y, then Conclusion Z-except that one of the premises is left unstated. A syllogism with a missing premise is called an enthymeme, and an enthymeme can be persuasive only when the unstated premise is supplied by the audience.
Most arguments in everyday life and even in formal scholarship take the form of enthymemes.
Enthymematic arguments most commonly appear as a conclusion supported by a reason. If the conclusion seems sensibly drawn from the reason, it is because we are supplying an additional premise to complete the formal syllogism. In many cases, this unstated premise is a value judgment that explains why the stated reason is valid for drawing the conclusion. And because this form of argumentation is so familiar, we often fail to notice that the value judgment is even part of the argument.
A good example of this sort of enthymematic reasoning comes from Thomas Patterson's (1993) Out of Order, which contrasts the different types of information supplied by campaign news coverage when elections are framed as a game between two players rather than as two competing visions for governing the country. Patterson's argument about the historical importance of shifting from policy-oriented news to strategy-oriented news in American election coverage is clear and concise:
The voters . . . bring a governing schema to the campaign. Their chief concerns are what government has done before the election, what it will do after the election, and how this will affect them. The game schema, however, asks them to concentrate on who is winning, and why. The result is a breakdown in the type of communication that should occur during the course of the election (88).
In this passage, Patterson argues that because game-framed news coverage has increasingly supplanted policy-framed news coverage, the electoral communication system in the United States is no longer serving the needs of citizens. The conclusion ('the American electoral communication system is broken') is smartly drawn from the stated reason ('because gameframed election coverage has driven out policy-framed coverage'). But this argument also rests on an unstated premise, that voting decisions are supposed to be made from policy considerations. Only if this unstated premise also holds does it follow that the communication system is broken because game-framed election news has become the norm. But where does this unstated value judgment come from, and what normative argument can justify its application to this case? We don't know, for it is left as an unexamined part of the theoretical framework undergirding Patterson's argument.
There is nothing odd about this kind of omission. To the contrary, political communication studies make routine use of enthymematic reasoning, and with good effect. But this kind of argument only persuades when the unstated value judgment already resonates with its audience.
Such an argument can therefore only convince those who need no persuading. More importantly, enthymematic reasoning closes off lines of scholarly inquiry by directing attention away from unstated value judgments that are themselves contested and worthy of study. And because these unstated value judgments are therefore implicitly asserted rather than explicitly defined, the normative underpinnings of empirical research findings often go unnoticed and therefore unrecognized. Making them an explicit part of the scholarly conversation would do much to clarify what is really at stake in our research, because often disagreements about the importance or relevance of empirical findings are, at a deeper level, disagreements over the normative standards implicitly used to frame those empirical findings.
Normative assessment is therefore not some kind of new or unusual type of scholarly initiative. It has long been a standard part of empirical research, but conventional use of enthymematic reasoning has relegated it to an unstated backdrop of shared value judgments that implicitly justify the importance or relevance of empirical findings. A more valuable type of normative assessment would be more explicit, clarifying when and how value judgments are being applied to empirical findings, and would run deeper, clarifying the standards against which value judgments are drawn rather than merely asserting the relevance of a value.
Four Levels of Normative Assessment
In reflecting on the different contributions that normative assessment can make to empirical research, it is useful to think of these contributions as representing different levels of clarity and rigor in the process of articulating or justifying the normative relevance of empirical findings.
Four such levels of normative assessment are summarized in Table 1 , with each row representing a progressively deeper level of clarity and rigor in orienting a study's empirical findings to normative benchmarks.
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First-Level Normative Assessment
The first level of normative assessment occurs whenever enthymematic reasoning produces an implicit assertion of a finding's relevance or importance to a normative question. It is probably the most common type of normative assessment in empirical political communication research, and shows up as an argument that a particular finding is good or bad (or welcome, or troubling) for this or that reason. In this first level of normative assessment, the relationship of a conclusion to a reason is moderated by a value judgment that is itself merely asserted without clarifying either its origin or its validity for the argument being made. First-level normative assessment
often to assert the finding's importance or relevance to a current controversy or set of longstanding concerns. In whatever form, normative assessment at this second level goes beyond that from the first level by identifying a criterion value to support the normative claim being advanced. The result is a nominal judgment, where an empirical finding is said to either lack or possess the criterion value being invoked. The normative rationale for the author's evaluative stance is made clear by highlighting a criterion value, and for this reason the second level of normative assessment represents a significant theoretical step forward from the first level, which merely asserted a normative claim. But the second level of normative assessment involves assertion of a different sort, for it assumes the appropriateness of an evaluative criterion without developing a clear metric for determining how the criterion value should be applied or interpreted. If the news is insufficiently critical of government perspectives, how critical is critical enough? Without clear standards for applying a criterion value to an empirical finding, it will be difficult for other scholars to extend an author's evaluative stance to other cases.
Third-Level Normative Assessment
The third level of normative assessment defines standards for applying criterion values to empirical findings. By defining such standards, normative assessment at the third level aims to draw judgments about the degree to which an empirical finding possesses a criterion value. As with the second level of normative assessment, criterion values at the third level can appear as positional critiques, idealized contrasts, or as explicit definitions. But instead of the nominal judgment supplied by the second level of normative assessment, the third level offers an ordinal or interval measure of the amount of a criterion value that is revealed in an empirical finding.
The level of conceptual clarity required to produce such a measure yields two benefits for 
Fourth-Level Normative Assessment
The fourth level of normative assessment draws upon larger theoretical frameworks to clarify not only which criterion values are relevant for evaluating particular empirical relationships but also how different criterion values are related to one another and how conflicts between criterion values can be resolved. To achieve this degree of conceptual clarity, theoretical anchoring points suitable for fourth-level normative assessment will often fall into two groups: comparative frameworks and system theories. System theories hold at least three practical advantages over comparative frameworks for fourthlevel normative assessment. First, because system theories present abstract normative arguments rather than specific empirical comparisons, they can be more flexible and adaptive than comparative frameworks for fourth-level normative assessment. Because comparative frameworks are ideally used for evaluating apples against apples, applying this approach for normative assessment usually requires empirical findings that have fallen from apple trees. In contrast, system theories often can be used to assess pomegranates as easily as apples because the basis of comparison derives from reason rather than observation. The normative standards required for making value judgments are therefore more easily derived from systems theories than from comparative frameworks. Second, proper interpretation of historical precedents or comparable cases often requires immersion in a large and constantly updating body of contextual knowledge. System theories, in contrast, can often be applied to assess empirical findings at such a high level of generality that the opportunity costs of keeping current with relevant literatures remains fairly low after an initial investment to gain familiarity with salient and longstanding debates in normative democratic theory. Third, system theories tend to provide broader evaluative horizons than comparative frameworks. Rather than comparing the present to the past or to other cases in the present, system theories can be used to compare the present to the future, and the future can be anything. This flexibility entails an obvious risk: the set of possible things that might someday be is infinitely larger than the set of actual things that have once been, and the practical value of speculative assessment probably goes down as the ceiling for speculative thinking goes up. But this risk of increasing irrelevance should be weighed against the countervailing risk of neglecting Hume's guillotine. 
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normative assessment is still rarely seen in empirical studies. To illustrate the ease with which fourth-level normative assessment can be conducted, as well as the value to empirical scholarship for doing so, the rest of this chapter presents a fourth-level assessment of two current normative concerns in the political communication literature: the decline of social responsibility journalism and the increasing levels of audience segmentation across media properties. 
Fourth-Level Normative Assessment in Practice
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
What Republicanism can be thought of as rule by deliberated consensus, a system designed to help citizens discover their common interests by communicating with one another across lines of difference. Different models of republicanism place different responsibilities on citizens, but all tend to lean heavily on citizens to articulate, defend, and advance their interests in search of the best solution for the whole. In extreme forms of republicanism, such as those advanced by
Rousseau and carried forward in the communitarian tradition, citizens might be expected to legislate for themselves, political representation by elected officials might be minimal or absent, and collective choices might be decided primarily by the force of the better argument.
Pluralism is rule by competing groups, where likeminded citizens join together to advance their particular interests by bringing collective pressure to bear on governing institutions. Institutions serve to regulate the processes by which political decisions are reached, so that no group is unfairly advantaged in the competition for scarce resources. Although pluralism is sometimes equated with liberalism, pluralism is one form of liberalism and is of more recent vintage than liberal theory, which traces back to 18 th century thinkers like Madison and Locke and forward through John Stuart Mill to contemporaries like Dahl (1989) and Rawls (1971) . Within liberal theories, ensuring a fair political procedure for collective decision-making becomes the most proximate way of producing good collective decisions. Instead of judging the quality of the outcome, pluralism therefore emphasizes the quality of the process. This typically implies that the strongest pressure operating under fair rules should prevail.
Elitism is a minimalist model of democracy with the fewest expectations for ordinary citizens. A premise often shared by elite models is that the world has become so complicated and politics so obtuse that ordinary citizens have lost the capacity to identify their political interests and solve their political problems. Although it may sound distasteful, this premise is shared not only by elitism but also by a wide range of contemporary theories of democracy, as demonstrated in the exchange between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey from the 1920s (Dewey 1927; Lippmann 1922 Lippmann , 1925 . Both Lippmann (embracing an elite form of liberalism) and Dewey (advancing classic republican ideals within a liberal institutional framework) shared the premise that the complex structure of modern society made it difficult for ordinary citizens to judge their political interests. Their exchange hinged on whether this problem was potentially remediable. Within elite theories such as those advanced by Schumpeter (1976 Schumpeter ( [1942 ) and Weber (Ciepley 1999;
Held 2006 chapter 5), competition among teams of experts or charismatic leaders produces political decisions. As this competition ensues, citizens play the critical role of umpire by removing from office those leaders or teams of experts judged least desirable or competent.
Limited levels of citizen vigilance threaten democratic accountability most directly when democracy is conceived along republican lines, less so when it is conceived along pluralist lines, and least in elite models of democracy. Baker offers an important theoretical contribution for political communication research by outlining the ideal media systems implied by each of these models of democracy (2002: 148-153) . He notes that republicanism works best when it is served by information media that promote civic virtue in citizens, expose lapses in virtue among political leaders, and create a common forum for objective, informed, and inclusive debate. This republican ideal for political accountability, exemplified in the trustee or social responsibility model of political journalism (Commission on the Freedom of the Press 1947; Siebert et al. 1956) , is precisely what many political communication scholars seem to expect of the contemporary media environment.
However, the ideal media systems for pluralism and elitism would have quite different characteristics. Pluralism's ideal media system, according to Baker, would be tasked with providing the necessary conditions for sustaining a multiplicity of groups and helping those groups promote their particular interests. News media would serve pluralism best by telling groups when their interests were at stake, mobilizing groups to promote those interests, and making officials aware of what groups want. This view of journalism's role harkens back to Tocqueville's (1969 Tocqueville's ( [1835 : Part II, chps. 6 and 7) vision of the newspaper as a former and sustainer of group-based civic engagement. A group-based version of democracy risks being poorly served by a news system that delivers an objective, factual account of public affairs designed to appeal to the widest possible audience. Instead, the ideal news system for pluralist democracy would be narrowly targeted to specific groups. The goal is not that each group would have its views represented within every channel of communication, but that each group would have its own channels of communication to keep it abreast of developments affecting its welfare, help it form persuasive arguments in support of its interests, and allow it to convey those interests to political leaders. This idea is similar to the subaltern counterpublic system envisioned by political theorist Nancy Fraser (1992), in which a large number of group-specific public spheres provide communicative resources for groups to debate effectively in the main public sphere. In other words, the ideal media system for pluralism would be founded on advocacy journalism so that groups could be served with rhetorical ammunition along with factual information (e.g., Lasch 1990 ).
Baker suggests that the ideal media system for elite democracy would enable yet a third version of political accountability. According to Baker, elite democracy works best when the news media do mainly two things: promote the legitimacy of the expert-driven political system, and expose instances of corruption or incompetence among political leaders. Promoting the legitimacy of the system helps to insulate expert leaders from the destabilizing attacks of demagogues, who might threaten to mobilize a normally quiescent mass public against that public's own interests (which, in this view, are understood best by experts). Exposing corruption or incompetence helps to maximize the efficiency of an elite-driven political system by providing a market mechanism for exposing rent-seeking behavior, punishing inept officials and holding leaders responsible for bad choices. It is notable that elitism requires nothing like a socially responsible news media to do this job: a market-driven, info-taining, Chicken Little news system built around fulminating party hacks and scandal-mongering slime-slingers could probably meet all the requirements for political accountability in an elite democracy so long as it offered no fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the political order. Social responsibility journalism might provide a useful service for elitism, but elite democracies probably could function without it. An advocacy-based news system, on the other hand, could be downright threatening: it would tend to serve as a destabilizing presence by mobilizing groups of citizens around their perceived interests in ways that could undermine the smooth operation of an expert-driven democratic order.
These three theories of democracy outlined by Baker differ not only in terms of ideal media systems for maintaining political accountability, but also in how those models of accountability are undermined or enhanced by the growing levels of market segmentation in news systems around the world. Market segmentation is the division of one large potential audience into several smaller actual audiences, each exposed to different media. Increased levels of market segmentation tend to produce more specialized and customized content, all the better to satisfy varied consumer preferences for information delivery and form. Higher levels of segmentation also tend to produce specialized information flows to different audiences, which could reduce the chances that a population would hear about major issues of public concern at roughly the same time or in the same way. At the extreme, high levels of audience segmentation could insulate audiences from news of politics altogether, polarize attitudes about public problems, and shield incumbent politicians from being held accountable through the electoral process (e.g. , Sunstein 2001; Prior 2007; Katz 1996) .
Baker points out that higher levels of audience segmentation are anathema to the deliberative and broadly inclusive form of political accountability envisioned by republicanism. A graduallyfragmenting media system, growing audience segmentation, and lack of sustained popular attention to public affairs bode poorly for the republican ideal of an ever-engaged citizenry served by a small number of socially responsible news organizations. But the same developments have little consequence for the more limited forms of political accountability required for elite democracy. Quite the contrary, market-driven news that caters to popular preferences rather than challenging them nicely serves the needs of elite democracy. Baker suggests that the increasing segmentation of the news audience may matter little to the forms of accountability that hold elite democracy in check. Elitism has no important role prescribed for collective deliberation by the citizenry, requiring only that citizens exercise an occasional form of popular sovereignty limited to the ballot box.
There is an interesting twist when it comes to accountability mechanisms for pluralist democracy. The same developments that spell bad news for republican forms of democracy and indifferent news for elitism make for potentially good news when it comes to pluralism and its distinctive version of group-based political accountability. Baker argues that higher levels of audience segmentation serve the needs of pluralist democracy by increasing market incentives for news outlets to diversify into specialty products catering to the needs of distinctive groups.
The growing prominence of partisan news outlets on cable television and the World Wide Web is a welcome development for the accountability mechanisms supporting pluralist conceptions of democracy. Historically, advocacy journalism has been the norm in democratic societies rather than the exception. And although the growth of sensationalizing and partisan news outlets is taken in some corners as a sign of how far news standards have fallen (e.g., Patterson 1993; Schudson 1998b) , even in the United States the standard medium for public affairs news from colonial times until well after World War I was either a partisan newspaper or a sensationalistic outlet catering to 'lowbrow' tastes, tracing its lineage from the penny press of the 1830s through the yellow press of the early 20 th century (e.g., Hamilton 2004; Schudson 1978 Schudson , 1998a Schudson and Tifft 2005) . From the standpoint of pluralist theories of democracy, the slow demise of social responsibility journalism in the United States over the past 30 years can be seen not as a cause for alarm but rather a return to a more vibrant and typical accountability system that had served the needs of democracy long before the rise of objective journalism in the early 20 th century. That noted, any erosion of the overall audience for news may be a cause for concern even for pluralism.
In the real contention is often not over how adversarial the news should be, but rather which model of democracy should the news be organized around. From Baker's analysis, we can infer that the news should probably be most critical of government claims in an advocacy press system, since pluralism places greater emphasis on mobilizing the likeminded around their narrow interests than on enlightening the citizenry as a whole regarding its common interests. If proponents of a 'less-passive' news system have something in mind other than advocacy journalism in the service of pluralistic mobilization, fourth-level normative assessment can clarify the end goal that critical news is supposed to be serving as well as the larger theoretical framework in which that goal is posited as an important aim.
Conclusion
Political communication research often asserts that empirical findings are important or relevant for democratic politics without identifying the value judgments that support these assertions. One consequence is that although empirical studies often make normative claims, empirical scholars may fail to recognize those claims as normative because the value judgments are lurking in the background as unstated premises. Empirical scholars therefore routinely advance normative arguments about the importance or relevance of their findings to the larger world without being aware that they are doing so. Because these normative arguments are often disconnected from their theoretical origins, inconsistencies among normative claims become hard to spot and the demands of competing claims become difficult to resolve.
The goal of normative assessment is to address these problems by locating, disclosing, and refining the normative assumptions already being used by empirical researchers to explain the importance of their findings for the practice of democratic politics. Instead of leaving matters by concluding that the news is somehow too critical-or not critical enough-normative assessment invites us to consider what the news is supposed to do or be from different theoretical perspectives. The purpose of normative assessment within empirical research is never to assert one's preferred version of reality. It is rather to clarify the chain of assumptions that lead from first principles to claims about media and citizen performance. Normative assessment aims to supply the missing 'backstory' that is required to evaluate a claim that the media ought to be something other than what it is, or seems to be.
Inattention to the normative origins of value judgments in political communication research can
give rise to peculiar types of theoretical dissociation. On the one hand, some criterion values drawn from republican theory are often emphasized and celebrated in the literature (e.g., the importance of including multiple perspectives in public deliberation, an emphasis on 'serious' analysis of public affairs) while other important criterion values (e.g., scrutinizing the moral health of politicians) are misrecognized and incorrectly assumed to interfere with 'good' democratic communication even though republican theory considers them essential. On the other hand, it often goes unrecognized that common concerns in empirical political communication research about apparent problems like increasing market segmentation and the decline of social responsibility journalism are mainly 'problems' for a particular school of thought within normative democratic theory. Only after other schools of thought are recognized and brought into the conversation does it become apparent that the bad news for republicanism might be good news for pluralism and a matter of indifference for elitism.
Making the value judgments that underlie empirical analysis a more explicit part of the scholarly conversation would provide several benefits for empirical research in political communication. 
